July 20 2024

Experimental Edition. Tried to bite off more than could be chewed, so this one ended up weird, but it isn't terrible by any stretch.


Forbes wrote an issue about Russia’s dwindling stockpile of Soviet equipment. They said that Russia maintains a force of around 470,000 troops on the front lines. They point to a statement by Shoigu, claiming that 1,530 tanks were delivered to the Russian military in 2023 and that 85% of the tanks were not new, but were instead old tanks taken out of storage. They estimated that since the war began, about 175 T-90Ms have been sent to the front and estimates say that Russia is nearing the production of 90 of these tanks per year. Some analysts say that most of these are just upgraded T-90As and that totally new production might be as low as 28 per year. One expert they cite says Russia can only make 30 totally new tanks per year, of all models combined. One “new” T-90M captured by Ukraine had a gun that was manufactured in 1992. They say high-quality ball bearings are still an issue for Russia, and that Chinese replacements are low quality. One expert they consulted, said that much of the welding in Russian armored vehicle factories is not automated, it is still being done by hand in factories operating around the clock. Many of their machine tools were imported years ago from Europe and are now old and are increasingly difficult to maintain.

The Forbes article says that Russia is manufacturing and importing enough artillery shells, roughly 3 million this year, but their limitation is the artillery pieces themselves, specifically the barrels. They state the Russian howitzer barrels need to be changed every few months due to wear. Forbes’ expert says there are only 2 factories in Russia making artillery barrels, and both use imported Austrian rotary forging machines, the newest one being imported in 2017. Each factory can produce about 100 barrels per year, and Russia needs thousands. Russia has never manufactured rotary forging machines. An OSINT researcher that Forbes cites says that by the start of the year, Russia had taken 4,800 old barrels off of artillery pieces in storage and put them on ones in the field and that Russia still has about 7,000 pieces in storage in unknown condition and operability.

The Forbes article says that Russia had about 3,200 tanks in storage in February 2024, but 70% of them have not moved or been touched since the start of the war and many are likely in “very poor condition.” 2 experts cited by Forbes say that Russia is likely to reach a “critical point of exhaustion” of its useable tanks and armored vehicles in storage in the second half of next year. One of Forbe’s experts says Russia might even be forced to take a more defensive posture before the end of the summer.


The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) released a 40+ page report analyzing Ukraine's 2022-23 offensive operations, with a focus on the 2023 Ukrainian offensive and the battle for Bakhmut. Here are some of the takeaways.  

    • Ukraine suffered 30,000 killed and missing in 2022.
    • Bakhmut had limited strategic value after being heavily destroyed.
    • Ukrainian General Staff feared its fall would lead to Chasiv Yar being the next target, which could then put Kramatorsk in range of artillery and threaten vital supply routes.
    • Initially, the defense decision was justified by heavy Russian losses.
    • Bakhmut was a difficult location to defend; it is located in a lowland area.
    • By February, Russia had artillery control over main routes, making Ukrainian troop rotations difficult and causing less favorable loss ratios for Ukraine.
    • Russia’s artillery advantage was 5:1 during the battle.
    • Around 10,000 Ukrainian servicemen were killed or wounded in the battles around Bakhmut.
    • Russian forces, primarily Wagner Group troops and mobilized prisoners suffered 19,547 killed and the same number seriously wounded.
    • Ukraine theoretically achieved a 4:1 ratio.
    • 88% of Wagner's losses consisted of untrained convicts, with 40-60 seriously skilled fighters being lost per week.
    • Ukraine was losing a larger proportion of its veteran fighters than Russia was.
    • Ukraine’s best tactical move would have been to withdraw to a new defensive line once Russia established artillery control over the city and routes in and out.
    • Politically, withdrawing from Bakhmut was seen as risky, potentially reducing the amount of international support Ukraine would receive and the speed at which Ukraine would receive it.
    • Bakhmut acquired symbolic strategic importance that led to the abandonment of traditional military thinking.
    • The decision to hold onto Bakhmut influenced the shape and timing of the planned counteroffensive.
    • Losses of experienced soldiers in Bakhmut hindered the formation of new, capable units.
    • Experienced forces were used to hold off Russians while new units prepared for the counteroffensive.
    • Russia had 105,000 troops to defend the Orikhiv–Tokmak–Melitopol axis. They had 470 tanks, up to 1,410 armored fighting vehicles, over 720 artillery systems, up to 230 MLRS, and 12 operational–tactical missile complexes.
    • Ukraine hoped a quick and powerful enough strike could cause a localized collapse, allowing for a more mobile fighting style, where Russian unit cohesion would break down.
    • Despite having around 400,000 combat troops, many were not adequately trained or equipped for breaching operations.
    • The need to maintain defenses across the front and replenish losses limited Ukraine's ability to concentrate more troops for the offensive.
    • By July 2023, the Russian forces attacking Ukraine had increased to approximately 450,000 personnel, with 2,200 tanks and 5,150 armored combat vehicles.
    • The Orikhiv–Tokmak attack began on 3 June, preceded by artillery preparation and planned nighttime assaults, but mistakes delayed the initial main attack until after dawn.
    • Initial phases suffered from inadequate coordination between frontline troops and offensive forces, resulting in friendly fire incidents and logistical delays.
    • Ukraine attempted breaches using MICLIC and UR-77 Meteorit mine clearing systems but faced challenges such as the minefields being too deep to clear with these vehicles and inexperienced crews.
    • Ukrainian forces lacked sufficient demining equipment. They only had 10 demining vehicles available preventing Ukraine from clearing broad lanes to advance though, leaving columns vulnerable to Russian ATGMs and mines. Those demining vehicles were prone to overheating.
    • Lead vehicles in narrow, mine-free patches would get hit, causing Ukrainian vehicles to get bunched up leading to concentrated Ukrainian armor vulnerable to Russian artillery.
    • Russian countermeasures significantly reduced the effectiveness of precision munitions.
    • Excalibur's accuracy dropped to 6% by August 2023 from 70% initially due to electronic warfare (EW) measures.
    • Electronic protection systems could redirect entire GMLRS salvos aimed at specific targets.
    • Russian air defenses were calibrated to intercept GMLRS, limiting their effectiveness.
    • The use of alternative munitions like HARMs, EW, and decoys made GMLRS strikes effective again.
    • Timing and selection of appropriate operational conditions also played a crucial role in successful strikes.
    • Russian counterbattery capabilities were limited by the shorter ranges of many Russian artillery pieces as compared to western ones.
    • The blending of Ukrainian units led to confusion and logistical problems.
    • Early failures impacted morale and confidence, many units were not supplied with sufficient Western equipment.
    • Russian forces effectively responded to Ukrainian advances with aggressive counterattacks, and flanking ambushes which slowed Ukrainian progress and led to repeated assaults on captured positions.
    • Ukrainian forces faced significant challenges in resupplying troops due to Russian artillery and minefield threats, compounded by limited demining equipment and night vision capabilities.
    • Ukrainian commanders faced critical decisions on resource distribution between different directions of advance (southern vs. eastern), with political pressures influencing the decision-making process.
    • Ukraine's use of Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles had limited impact on Russian ground operations but successfully targeted Russia’s navy.
    • The Ukrainian offensive peaked in early August and then focused on tactical gains rather than achieving a decisive breakthrough.
    • By October 2022, Russia began mobilizing, increasing its troop numbers in Ukraine and establishing domestic production of military equipment.
    • Ukrainian forces faced challenges in maintaining offensive momentum due to inadequate force quality, insufficient training, and logistical limitations, despite some advantages in quality.
    • Ukraine’s operations suffered from leaks and poor operational security, allowing Russia to prepare for Ukrainian offensives. Some of these leaks came from international partners and allowed Russia to get an idea of Ukrainian force size, location, and composition.
    • Some of Russia’s key strengths, such as aviation were identified in war-gaming, but the offensive was launched without any solutions for overcoming these strengths.
    • ATACMS were eventually supplied allowing for the mitigation of some of Russia’s air power, but by then, it was too late to make a difference for the offensive.
    • Ukrainian planning was hindered by overly optimistic assumptions, inadequate military size, and failure to predict and adapt to Russian aviation and minefields.
    • Delays in international support and decision-making hampered Ukraine's ability to launch its offensive effectively. For instance, The wargames also uncovered the fact that Ukraine had an insufficient number of demining vehicles, but that did not cause allies to provide significantly more demining machines promptly. Aid was often delivered at intervals and in quantities that did not match NATO doctrine.
    • By June 2023, the Russian ground forces increased to 420,000 personnel, 1,980 tanks, 4,450 armored combat vehicles, 2,750 artillery systems, 860 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems MLRS, and 46 operational-tactical missile systems.
    • During the offensive, Ukraine had its densest concentration of 155mm artillery pieces in the Orikhiv–Tokmak region, but ammunition limitations meant each gun was firing on average 70 rounds per day, but uneven supply could leave guns with 10 rounds each per day.
    • Ukraine often achieved localized superiority, but this would be lost when advancing.
    • Sometimes Ukrainian troops had to storm positions that were defended by a superior number of men.


There was more. But the whole thing was 40 something pages of analysis and this is what stood out to me.


Link to the report:
https://static.rusi.org/lessons-learned-ukraine-offensive-2022-23.pdf


On July 18th, 2024, based on verified video footage of destroyed, abandoned, and captured equipment, Russian forces lost an estimated $28,730,000 worth of equipment, while Ukrainian forces suffered $9,550,000 worth of losses, a ratio of roughly 3:1. A majority of Russia's losses came from the destruction of multiple artillery systems, while Ukraine faced the expensive loss of a P-18 radar. These estimates of vehicle losses are based on Andrew Perpetua’s published lists of confirmed losses.

A database of these equipment loss values has been built and is being updated daily. It can be found at:

https://tinyurl.com/RTMnumbers


Quote of the Day:
“Rather than love,ha tn money, than fame, give me hedgehogs.”
― Henry David Thoreau, Walden